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DORE GOLD: TOWER OF BABBLE 
STUDY GUIDE, 2005-2008 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
INTRODUCTION:  THE ROOTS OF CHAOS 
 
Outline 
 
A. ADDRESSING THE GLOBAL CRISIS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  (1-3) 
1. George H. W. Bush’s New World Order 
2. Reemergence of Utopian Enthusiasm after WW!! 
a. Earlier examples: League of Nations and the Concert of Europe 
3. Crippling Flaws of the United Nations 
4. Author’s Thesis 
a. The UN in not a benign but ineffective world body; it has actually 
accelerated and spread world chaos 
B. “THERE IS NO NEUTRAL GROUND”  (3-6) 
1. Bush’s Critique of the UN, 9-12-02 
a. Reminder of the UN’s original purpose: to combat aggressors and 
protect human rights 
2. UN Was Born at a Moment of Extraordinary Moral Clarity 
3. The Case against Saddam Hussein 
a. Human rights abuses 
b. Violation of 16 Security Council resolutions that fell under Chapter VII 
4. Moral Judgments Are a Necessary Prerequisite for Taking Action 
a. Purpose of the Security Council 
 5. The Problem 
  a. The UN’s refusal to make moral judgments 
  b. Order vs. chaos 
C. MORAL EQUIVALENCE  (6-12) 
 1. UN’s Failures 
  a. Somalia 
  b. Rwanda 
  c. Srebrenica 
  d. Kosovo 
  e. Macedonia 
 2. Kofi Annan’s Failure 
  a. UN’s policy of reflexive neutrality 
  b. David Rieff’s critique 
 3. Annan: The Quintessential UN Bureaucrat 
  a. The UN’s institutional ideology of impartiality 
  b. Khmer Rouge protected by Javier Pérez de Cuellar 
  c. Pol Pot 
 4. Diplomatic Neutralism Is Immoral 
  a. Worship of consensus 
 5. UN’s Flaw 
  a. Saddam Hussein 
  b. Richard Butler’s critique 
  c. “moral equivalence” 
 6. Iraq: Oil for Food Program 
  a. $10.1 billion stolen 
  b. Investigations 
 7. Other Scandals 
  a. Spread of AIDS 
  b. UN sex trade 
 8. UN Agencies 
  a. Libya’s Qaddafi chaired the Human Rights Commission 
  b. Syria’s election to the Security Council 
 9. Moral Equivalence 
  a. Resolutions: Dripping in moral equivalence even when they may be non- 
binding 
10. Post-Cold War UN Role 
a. UN seen as a source of international legitimacy 
D. THE SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY  (12-18) 
1. Loss of Moral Clarity 
2. The Original UN Was an Alliance Built on Shared Interests 
a. Soviets and Saudis merely abstained from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights  
3. Tower of Babel: Original Member States Spoke the Same Political Language 
a. Introduction of new political languages by new members 
b. Loss of the clarity of 1945 as UN member states talked past each other 
c. Churchill’s hope: a true temple of peace, not merely a cockpit in a Tower 
of Babel 
4. A Minority of 75 Free Democracies out of 184 Member States in 1993 
5. Third World Authoritarianism 
a. Soviet bloc resolution on human rights, 1985 
b. Preemption of humanitarian intervention 
6. Annan on the UN’s Unique Legitimacy 
a. Practical implications: superiority of a consensus of dictators 
7. Military Action by the United States 
a. Not dependent on UN approval when vital American interests are 
involved, e.g., the naval quarantine of Cuba and the Korean War 
8. The Security Council Has Approved the Use of Military Force Only Twice 
9. UN Charter’s Restrictions on the Use of Force 
a. The UN Charter was not supposed to supersede the US Constitution 
for Americans 
b. Doctrine that states lack the moral authority to make decisions about 
their own security threatens to undermine the global war on terrorism 
10. UN’s Failure to Identify Aggressors 
a. U Thant 
11. Serious Threats Are Often Handled Outside the UN Framework 
a. Khmer Rouge 
b. Idi Amin 
c. Bangladesh 
d. Kosovo 
12. Legitimacy of Extra-Legal Interventions 
a. Michael Walzer 
 13. George H. W. Bush’s “New World Order” 
  a. George F. Will’s dissent 
 14. Accusation of Unilateralism 
E. INEPT HANDLING AND UNNECESSARY TARGETS  (18-21) 
1. Breakdown of the Non-Proliferation System 
a, Opposition to ABMs 
 2. African Secessionist Movements and Apartheid Regimes 
 3. General Assembly Res. 3379: “Zionism Is Racism” 
 4. Anti-Israel Activity Led to Turning a Blind Eye to Urgent Crises 
  a. Liberian civil war 
  b. Sierra Leone 
 5. Belated Action 
  a. Congo, 1998: delay until 2003 
 6. UN: A Transparently Politicized Body 
 7. The UN Is Not a Neutral Party 
  a. Richard Butler 
  b. “Impartiality” 
 8. Erosion of the UN’s Original Standards 
F. PERPETUATING TERRORISM  (21-23) 
1. Refusal to Abandon Impartiality 
2. Failure to Stand Up to Terrorism 
3. Suicide Terrorism Legitimized 
a. Definition as “resistance to occupation” even though the Palestinian 
Authority ruled 
 4. Human Rights Commission Supports Resistance 
G. “EVIL IS PREVAILING”  (23-24) 
1. Sergio Vieira de Mello 
 
Review 
 
United Nations: author’s view express purpose of the UN Rwanda and Bosnia massacres 
Richard Butler   Kofi Annan   U Thant 
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar  Security Council approval for the use of force 
how the massacres of Cambodians, Ugandans, East Pakistanis, and Kosovars were ended  
George F. Will on the UN Res. 3379 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  THE EROSION OF STANDARDS 
 
Outline 
 
A. CREATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS  (25-27) 
1. United Nations: An American Idea 
a. Daniel Moynihan: “At first the UN was seen as the instrument of 
American ideologues.” 
2. Origin 
a. The role of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
b. The Atlantic Charter 
c. Declaration by United Nations, 1942 
3. Purpose 
4. Dumbarton Oaks Conference 
a. The four policemen 
5. San Francisco: Founding Conference 
a. Security Council 
b. General Assembly 
 6. Built-in Tensions 
  a. Utopian proposals [Francis Lieber earlier noted this tendency] 
 7. Walter Lippmann: Responsibility for World Order Must Not be Delegated 
B. MORAL CLARITY  (28-32) 
1. Membership Prerequisite: Belligerence Against the Axis 
2. Collective Security 
a. Two prerequisites for its success 
Identify aggression 
    Mobilize a response 
3. Moment of Moral Clarity 
a. Nuremberg trials against Nazi war criminals 
b. Fundamental human rights 
4. Benign View of the USSR 
a. Excusing Soviet behavior, e.g., James Byrnes compared what Churchill 
later called the “Iron Curtain” to the Rio Treaty 
b. Loophole in the Genocide Convention of 1948 
c. Alger Hiss, acting secretary-general at the founding conference 
5. Minimal Influence of the USSR 
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
  a. Eleanor Roosevelt, first chairman of the UN Commission on Human 
  `  Rights, called it a “common standard” 
  b. Authors included Eleanor Roosevelt, René Cassin, Charles Malik, and  
P. C. Chang 
  c. Overwhelming political agreement 
  d. Hassan al-Turabi’s view, 1994 
 7. Addition of New States 
  a. Dissolution of European colonial empires 
  b. Authoritarian offspring of the former USSR and totalitarian Islamist 
    regimes 
c. Clash of ideologies rather than a clash of civilizations 
 8. Nonaligned Movement 
 9. Growing Influence of Authoritarian Regimes 
 10. Dean Acheson’s Critique 
C. OPENING THE DOOR FOR AGGRESSION  (33-36) 
1. Post-Cold War World 
a. George H. W. Bush’s vision for a “new world order” 
b. Madeleine Albright on the Security Council 
2. Loss of a Common Sense of Purpose 
a. Opposition to human rights by the majority Afro-Asian bloc 
b. 1993 human rights declaration omitted freedom of speech and 
freedom of assembly 
3. Debates of Decolonization 
a. General Assembly Res. 1514 (XV) 
b. Soviet bloc gains 
4. Seizure of Goa, 1961 
a. Jawaharlal Nehru’s rationale 
b. Adlai Stevenson’s appeal 
5. Struggle to Define Aggression 
a. Subversion 
b. Self-determination issue 
c. Protection of peoples under “alien domination” 
D. CONDONING TERRORISM  (36-40) 
1. Freedom Fighters 
Res. 2708 (XXV) 
2. Airplane Hijackings 
3. Yasser Arafat’s Speech, 1974 
4. New Concept of Collective National Rights 
a. Idi Amin 
b. 1979 exception on hostage taking 
c. Res. 37/43, 1982 
5. Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorist Bombings 
E. BEYOND A “TALK HOUSE”  (40-43) 
1. Richard Holbrooke’s “Talk House” 
a. General Assembly’s new value structure 
2. Modifying the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
a. Elevated legal status of “national liberation” groups 
3. Human Rights Commission Resolution Against Israel 
b. United States voted off the Commission 
4. General Assembly’s Decisions Provide Political Guidance to the Secretary- 
General 
a. René Cassin’s complaint in the 1950s 
  b. Secretary-General promotes UN General Assembly resolutions 
F. FAILURE  (43) 
1. The Old UN Was Born in the Shadow of the Holocaust 
2. The New UN Did Nothing in Response to Mass Murder in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
Review 
 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference FDR’s “four policemen”  purpose of the Security Council 
Commission on Human Rights Charles Malik   Eleanor Roosevelt 
René Cassin   Alger Hiss   Jawaharlal Nehru 
India’s seizure of Goa  Adlai Stevenson’s warning Dean Acheson 
Madeleine Albright  Walter Lippmann  Richard Holbrooke 
new concept of human rights exception to the international convention against hostage taking 
1949 Geneva Conventions Res. 1514 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  FAILURE FORESHADOWED 
 
Outline 
 
A. FIRST POSTWAR ARMED AGGRESSION: PALESTINE  (45-52) 
1. Trygve Lie’s Response 
a. Arab League invasion 
2. Security Council Warned 
 a. American response 
 b. Soviet response 
c. UN’s Lack of Responsiveness 
3. British Mandatory Palestine: A Group of Ottoman Imperial Districts Since 1517 
a. Sharif Hussein 
b. Balfour Declaration 
c. Double-cross [more of a triple cross because France was involved, too] 
d. Mandate system 
4. Article 80 of the UN Charter 
5. UNSCOP 
a. Partition 
b. General Assembly Res. 181, November 29, 1947 
c. Jerusalem 
6. Creation of Israel 
7. Arab Walkout from General Assembly 
8. Palestinian Arabs Resort to Military Force 
a. Jerusalem water supply cut off 
b. Security Council inaction 
9. Full-Scale Invasion, May 14, 1948 
10. Fall of the Old City of Jerusalem and Expulsion of Jewish Residents 
a. Abba Eban: UN’s “active relinquishing of responsibility in a critical hour.” 
11. Expiration of the old League of Nations Mandate 
12. Israel Defense Force (IDF) 
 a. Harel Brigade under Yitzhak Rabin 
13. Moral Significance: The UN Had Not Lifted a Finger to Defend the Jews of 
Jerusalem 
B. REWARDING AGGRESSION  (52-56) 
1. Reversing Principle by Penalizing the Victim 
a. Truce imposed on May 29 
 2. Bernadotte Plan: Proposed Arab Sovereignty over Jerusalem 
. 3. Assassination of Folke Bernadotte by Lehi [which was led by Yitzhak Shamir, 
who later served as an Israeli PM] 
4. Renewed Calls for Internationalizing Jerusalem 
 a. Jordan annexes the West Bank 
 b. Jordanian abuses 
5. Palestinian Refugees 
a. Displaced Persons (DPs) 
b. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Definition of 
  a Refugee 
6. Palestinian Exception 
a. Franklin Delano Roosevelt on Arab immigration into Palestine 
7. Two Separate Agencies with Differing Missions 
a. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
(1) Supposed to find permanent homes for refugees 
b. UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
   (1) Support Palestinian refugees within camps created by Arab 
     states 
  c. Refugee status of Palestinians redefined, making the number 900,000 
  d. Arab states thwarted resettlement plans 
   (1) Arab vote against Res. 194 
8. UN Acquiesces to Arab Position on Refugees 
9. Arab States Were the Most Responsible for Displacing Palestinians 
10. The Refugee Problem Was a Direct Result of the Arab States’ Aggression 
a. More than 570,000 Jewish refugees from Arab states 
C. FAILING ANOTHER TEST  (56-65) 
1. Partition of British India 
a. Pakistan: Muslim State 
  b. India: Secular State 
2. 584 Princely States 
a. Lord Mountbatten 
b. Jammu and Kashmir 
3. Maharaja Appealed to the Indian Government fore Help 
a. Instrument of Accession 
b. Indian View 
 (1) Dilemma: Exclusion of Kashmir would raise doubts about India’s 
   commitment to secularism 
c. Pakistani View 
 (1) India’s annexation of Kashmir would leave Pakistan without a 
   buffer zone 
4. Appeal to the UN 
a. India’s charge: Pathan invaders were transported from near the Afghan 
border 
  b. Pakistani denial that it had provided assistance to the tribesmen 
   (1) Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan challenged the validity of 
     Kashmir’s accession to India and charged India with conducting 
     a genocidal policy [an demagogic example of “outbidding”] 
5. UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) 
a. Lack of decisive action 
b. Aggression treated as a dispute 
 (1) By referring it to the UN, India had unwittingly prolonged the 
   Kashmir dispute 
6. What Went Wrong 
a. Britain’s and America’s strategic interests in Pakistan 
b. Res. 726 
c. False symmetry 
7. Pakistani Falsehoods 
a. Josef Korbel 
b. Pakistani intervention 
 (1) Role of Akbar Khan 
8. First Interim Report 
a. UNCIP substantiated India’s charges but the UN was unwilling to 
deal with aggression 
b. Karachi Agreement, June 1949 and UNMOGIP 
 9. Second Kashmir War: 1966 ceasefire brokered by Alexei Kosygin 
 10. Establishment of Bangladesh 
  a. Simla Agreement, 1972 
D. THE LEGACY OF EARLY FAILURES  (65-69) 
 1. UN’s Betrayal of Its Founding Vision 
  a. False equivalence 
 2. Territorial Integrity Issue 
  a. Article 2 
  b. Loophole for irredentist claims 
3. China’s Invasion of Tibet, 1950 
4. Spread of Aggression: Absence of a Firm Norm 
 a. North Korean invasion 
 b. Goa 
5. Use of Force to Consolidate New States Became the New Norm 
a. Indonesia: North Borneo and East Timor 
6. Assaults on Colonial Legacies 
a. Lebanon 
b. Kuwait 
7. Absence of a Clear and Consistent Response 
a. Portuguese colonies 
b. Falkland Islands 
c. Kuwait 
8. Security Council Mandate 
a. Moral relativism was an inevitable by-product of the UN’s work 
9. What Held the International Community Together Was the Alliance System 
Created by the Cold War 
 
Review 
 
UN, American, and Soviet reaction to Arab invasion of Israel Trygve Lie 
Andrei Gromyko  Balfour Declaration  Bernadotte Plan 
League of Nations Mandate for Palestine   Res. 181 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees  Palestinian refugees 
FDR on Arab immigration into Palestine    creation of Israel 
Jewish refugees from Arab states    1966 India-Pakistan ceasefire 
Alexei Kosygin   UNCIP    Kashmir referred to the UN 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  THE COLD WAR FREEZE 
 
Outline 
 
A. KOREAN WAR  (71-75) 
1. Invasion 
Trygve Lie 
2. Situation Before the Invasion 
Postwar occupation 
Earlier Japanese occupation 
3. Res. 82 and 83 
4. Military Aid and an American-Led Force 
Pusan 
5. Soviet Boycott of the Security Council 
6. Soviet Perspective 
7. UN Had Failed to Deter North Korea 
8. “Defense Perimeter” Issue 
a. Announcement by Dean Acheson 
9. Soviet Presidency of the Security Council, 1950 
a. Allegation of mass extermination of Koreans [another example of 
outbidding] 
10. Inchon Landing 
B. AMERICA TAKES THE LEAD  (75-79) 
1. Acheson’s Uniting for Peace Resolution 
a. Success of the maneuver 
b. Long-term consequences 
(1) It boomeranged back on American interests 
   (2) U.S. veto bypassed in 1967 
 2. Pandora’s Box 
  a. Erosion of Security Council’s authority 
  b. Concern about an expanded war 
   (1) Douglas MacArthur’s advance into North Korea 
   (2) Chinese counterattack 
  c. The General Assembly cannot dispatch forces 
   (1) UN “recommendations” 
   (2) Gulf War authorization 
3. Korean and Iraqi War Justifications Were Comparable 
4. UN Provided Legitimacy for the Military Campaign 
C. “WHAT IS THE UNITED NATIONS DOING?” 
1. Dag Hammarskjöld 
a. UN as a “third force” 
b. Support of Patrice Lumumba 
c. Katanga 
d. Moise Tshombe 
e. Diplomatic standing given to Katanga 
f. Hammarskjöld’s assassination 
2. Hammarskjöld’s Poor Relations with Moscow 
a. His desire to make the UN a sounding board 
3. Hungarian Revolt of 1956 
a. Imre Nagy 
b. Invocation of Acheson’s United for Peace Resolution 
c. Soviet encirclement 
d. General Assembly discussions 
e. Hungarian appeal 
4. Suez Crisis 
a. UN’s condemnations proved effective because Britain, France, and Israel 
were democracies 
b. Public opinion is irrelevant for dictatorships 
5. Charting a Neutralist Course 
6. Laos 
a. Kennedy administration convened a Geneva Conference in 1961 
7. UN’s Propaganda Value 
D. THE CRISIS IN CUBA AND UN INACTION  (82-88) 
1. U2 Reconnaissance Photos, October 16, 1962 
2. Kennedy’s Public Address, October 22 
a. Imposition of a strict quarantine 
3. Ambassador Stevenson’s Presentation 
a. OAS support for military action 
b. Why Art. 51 was not invoked 
4. American Allies Notified 
5. Security Council debate 
a. Valerian Zorin’s role 
b. Stevenson’s question 
c. Stevenson’s retort 
d. Display of photos 
e. Adjournment 
6. U Thant’s appeal 
a. Kennedy’s complaint 
b. Khrushchev’s acceptance of the appeal 
7. Khrushchev Capitulates, October 28 
  a. RFK’s Ultimatum to Dobrynin 
   (1) Khrushchev’s later admission 
  b. US withdraws missiles from Turkey 
 8. Verification Issue 
E. THE TURN AWAY FROM AMERICA  (88-90) 
1. Problem with U Thant’s Diplomacy 
a. Khrushchev: “U Thant wouldn’t allow the UN to do anything detrimental 
to the interests of the Soviet Union.” 
2. Moral Force of the Secretary-General Eroded 
3. American Optimism 
a. Dean Rusk’s confidence 
4. New Problems 
a. The UN became increasingly hostile to American interests  
 
Review 
 
“Uniting for Peace” resolution Douglas MacArthur  Dean Acheson 
Adlai Stevenson  Valerian Zorin   Dag Hammarskjöld 
Patrice Lumumba  Moise Tshombe  Imre Nagy 
U Thant 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  IGNITING WAR, UNDERMINING 
PEACE 
 
Outline 
 
A. BUILD-UP TOWARD WAR  (91-97) 
1. New Leadership in Moscow, 1964 
2. 1949 Armistice 
a. Mixed Armistice Commissions began breaking down, mid-1950s 
b. Hostile incursions into Israel 
c. Sea of Galilee: Artillery Strikes 
d. Golan Heights: Water Diversion 
3. Shelling from the Golan Heights in Syria, 1967 
4. Soviet Mischief 
a. USSR warns Egypt that Israel was preparing a major offensive 
b. Massing of Egyptian troops and tanks on the border 
5. Egypt Orders Partial Withdrawal of UNEF Peacekeepers, May 16 
a. UNEF was the pride of the UN 
b. Ras Nasrani 
6. The Matter Should Have Been Taken Before the General Assembly 
a. Earlier Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and Gaza 
b. U Thant ignored Hammarskjöld’s promise 
c. The gambit failed 
d. Egypt asks that UNEF be terminated, May 18 
7. UNEF Withdrawn 
a. U Thant ignored his earlier warning 
b. Decision had the support of Ralph Bunche and staff 
8. Closure of the Straits of Tiran 
a. Gamal Abdel Nasser 
b. U Thant tries to split the difference 
c. Nasser declines the offer 
9. Security Council Convened 
a. Soviets blocked action 
b. French wuwei [doing nothing, deliberately] 
c. Arthur Goldberg 
10. Failure of Pres. Johnson’s Proposal for Maritime Powers to Intervene 
B. WAR  (97-99) 
1. UN’s Failure 
a. King Hussein flies to Cairo 
b. Iraqi army 
2. Nasser’s Objective: Destroy Israel 
a. Combined forces: 250,000 troops, 2000 tanks, 700 frontline aircraft 
b. Israel’s lack of strategic depth 
 3. Preemptive Attack against Egypt 
  a. 200 Israeli aircraft destroyed Egypt’s air force on the ground 
  b. Diplomatic warning to King Hussein 
   (1) Odd Bull’s resentment 
 4. Jordanian Attack 
  a. Israel withheld fire until UN headquarters seized in Jerusalem 
 5. Middle East Map Changed 
  a. Gaza and Sinai 
  b. West Bank 
  c. Old City of Jerusalem 
  d. Golan Heights 
 6. UN Takes a More Active Role in the Postwar Settlement 
C. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT  (99-102) 
1. Soviet Position 
Security Council adopts a call for a ceasefire 
Soviet resolution failed 
2. Moscow Convenes an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly 
Kosygin condemned Israel as an aggressor 
Dobrynin’s proposal 
3. Soviets Triple the Size of Their Mediterranean Fleet 
Moscow’s use of the Suez Canal 
4. President Johnson’s Speech 
  a. Israel should not withdraw 
  b. Need for peace agreements 
  c. Need to respect territorial integrity 
 5. Soviet Resolution Failed in the General assembly 
  a. Israel not condemned as the aggressor 
D. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242  (102-07) 
 1. Agreed Basis for Later Peace Accords 
 2. Debate on the Withdrawal Clause 
  a. Article by Stephen Schwebel 
  b. Withdrawal must be to “secure and recognized boundaries” 
 3. The Old Armistice Lines Were Not Recognized International Boundaries 
 4. Illegality of the Previous Territorial Status Quo 
  a. West Bank 
  b. Gaza Strip 
 5. Status of Jerusalem 
 6. Lord Caradon’s Draft Resolution 
  a. Soviet objection 
  b. Unanimous approval 
  c. French text 
  d. Principle of textual interpretation [too often observed in the breach] 
 7. The Soviets Relent 
 8. American View 
  a. William Rogers 
  b. Pres. Ford 
  c. Pres. Reagan 
  d. George Schultz 
  e. Pres. Bush 41 
  f. Warren Christopher 
  g. Pres. Bush 43 
 9. Jerusalem Was Not Mentioned in the Text 
  a. Arthur Goldberg 
E. REGRESSION  (107-10) 
1. Importance of the Achievement 
  a. Pres. Johnson Outmaneuvered the Soviets 
2. UN Reverts to Form 
  a. Gunnar Jarring 
   (1) His reinterpretation 
3. New Resolutions 
a. Res. 3414 
  b. No room left for territorial compromise 
4. Kofi Annan Attacks the “Illegal Occupation” 
  a. Res. 242 is undercut 
  b. Future peacemaking efforts are undermined 
5. Flaws in the United Nations 
  a. Flaws had become intrinsic 
6. End of the Cold War 
 
Review 
 
Res. 242   Egypt’s act of war, 1967  shelling from Golan Heights 
closing of Tiran Strait  withdrawal of UNEF  Gamal Abdel Nasser 
King Hussein   Johnson speech  Lord Caradon 
Gunnar Jarring   status of Jerusalem 
 
CHAPTER FIVE:  THE RETURN OF THE UN? 
 
Outline 
 
a. REASONS FOR HOPE IN 1990  (111-12) 
 1. Optimism of Brian Urquhart and Other UN Advocates 
  a. UN acted quickly on Kuwait and Iraq 
  b. It acted in unison 
  c. It condemned Iraqi actions 
B. THE CRISIS EXPOSED SIGNIFICANT FAULTS  (112-16) 
 1. Past Failures to Condemn Iraq 
  a. Issue of whether the UN could have prevented the attack 
  b. Invasion of Iran, 1980 
  c. Some did not want to jeopardize their lucrative arrangements with Iraq 
 2. Kurt Waldheim Only Offered His “Good Offices” 
  a. Security Council Res. 479 
 3. Moral Equivalence 
 4. Failure to Deal with the Spread of WMDs 
  a. Iraq’s failure to honor commitments despite service on the IAEA 
  b. Osiraq nuclear reactor 
  c. Israeli strike 
  d. Duping of IAEA and Hans Blix 
  e. IAEA weakness again exposed in 2003 in the cases of Libya and Iran 
  f. Hans Blix’s cultural sensitivity courses 
 5. Genocide 
  a. Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on Halabja 
  b. Appointment of Gen. Ali Hasan al-Majid, “Chemical Ali” 
   (1) Anfal campaign of 1988 killed over 100,000 Kurds 
 6. Kurds Need International Protection 
  a. Allies supported Kurdish independence under the Treaty of Sèvres 
 7. Pérez de Cuéllar Adopts a Neutral Stance 
C. IGNORING GENOCIDE—AGAIN  (116-19) 
 1. Popular Rebellion in Kurdistan and the Shiite South after the Liberation of Kuwait 
  a. Ethnic cleansing of “Marsh Arabs” 
b. 1.5 million Kurds seek refuge in Turkey and Iran 
c. International refugee crisis 
 2. Toothless Security Council Res. 688: Call for “Open Dialogue” 
 3. Operation Provide Comfort 
 4. No-Fly Zone 
 5. Human Rights Watch Declared That Genocide Had Occurred 
  a. Failed effort to bring genocide charges 
D. CORRUPTION AND APPEASEMENT  (119-27) 
 1. UNSCOM 
 2. Security Council Res. 687 
 3. New Inspections: More Robust and Intrusive 
4. Iraq Destroyed Huge Quantities of Prohibited Weapons 
a. UNSCOM Created a “Concealment Unit” 
b. Burden of proof was placed on the Iraqi government 
5. What Brought About the Demise of UNSCOM Was Kofi Annan Himself 
a. Richard Butler named head of UNSCOM 
b. UN encroachments on his turf  
c. Ways Annan obstructed him 
6. Oil for Food Program 
a. Annan recommended doubling it in 1998 as Saddam Hussein was 
defying UNSCOM (February 1, 1998) 
b. Saddam pulled in $10.1 billion in illegal revenues 
  c. Corruption 
  d. Benon V. Sevan 
  e. Iraq imported banned military weapons and dual-use technology through 
    oil-for-food contracts 
7. Annan Led a UN Delegation to Baghdad, February 1998 
a. Richard Butler was excluded from the trip 
8. Memorandum of Understanding, February 23, 1998 
9. Annan’s Campaign Against UNSCOM 
a. Lakhdar Brahimi circumvented it 
b. Prakash Shah 
c. Failure of the Memorandum 
10. Saddam Hussein Suspended UNSCOM’s Disarmament Work, August 5, 1998 
E. THE EVIDENCE MOUNTS, AND THE UN DOES NOTHING  (127-32) 
1. Iraq Failed to Account for the Yeast Extract Growth Medium Used to Produce 
Anthrax 
 
Review 
 
Treaty of Sèvres 
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar 
Operation Provide Comfort 
Res. 688 
 
CHAPTER NINE:  THE UN BACKS TERRORISM 
 
Review 
 
Hizballah   Hamas    Muslim Brotherhood 
 
CONCLUSION:  FROM MORAL EQUIVALENCE TO 
WORLD ORDER 
 
Review 
 
democracy 
 
 
 
   
 
 
____      
